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Words Consciousness: Law and the
Control of Language
Walter Probert
The author believes that language, as "the major instrument of social
control," should be thoroughly understood by attorneys. But he doubts
that many lawyers are aware of the complexities and subtleties of lan-
guage. Here, and in much of his other work, the author tries to increase
the reader's sensitivity and appreciation of the communication process.
To accomplish this end he believes it is necessary in part to eschew con-
ventional styles of writing and depend on a -method that forces the reader
to become more involved with words.
1 EWIS CARROLL took Alice through the mirror of language,
4 casting light on words and life generally. How do it for law-
yers? Add Alice to the curriculum. Fantasy may be a good way to
crack through the shells into language, to expose the actors and ob-
servers of law to the interplay
THE AUTHOR: WALTER PROBERT (B.S., of law with language. In there,
J.D., University of Oregon; J.S.D., Yale
University) is a Professor of Law at the through that mirror, into the
University of Florida College of Law. play of words in communica-
His teaching specialties include Legal tion, in there lies a key which
Method and Law and Communication
and he is the author of the forthcoming opens the mind, blows it open.
book Law, Language, and Communica- The profession is not gen-
tion (to be published by Thomas & Co.,
probably in the Spring of 1972). erally well tutored in the ways
of words. Many are over-
trained as advocates, not enhanced with a wider and balanced sen-
sitivity to words, wily but not therefore wise, two-dimensional mas-
ters of a six-dimensional process. Manipulation is skill and power,
but at what cost and loss to other values. Generally ignored are the
risks of entrapment in rhetoric, as one is in turn manipulated with
mind closed and vision blocked.
Language is the major instrument of social control.' Thus it is
eminently suited to abuse and corruption precisely as much as its in-
ner workings are unlighted. The snare is laid in the "nursery" and
tightened in the process of acculturation. Since language is indis-
1 See generally J. FODOR & J. KATZ, THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE (1964); J.
HERTZLER, A SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE (1965); D. HYMES, LANGUAGE IN CULTURE
AND SOCIETY (1964); A. SMITH, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE (1965). These and
other footnote references and commentaries are not meant to be exhaustive. One in-
terested in an elaboration and underlying communication theory and pertinent references
may see Probert, Law Through the Looking Glass of Language and Communicative
Behavior, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 253 (1968).
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pensable to the child as he learns to cope with his environment and
himself, naturally he becomes particularly dependent upon it. He
becomes subject to domination by specific others, yes, but more subtly
by the invisible holds of language itself, in the mesh of forms which
helped in his humanization. Those very requirements of language
necessary to acculturation, continuing communication, and psychic
and intellectual growth, are silent media for all sorts of subliminal
messages, for major and minor forms of propaganda as well. Most
significant and resistant to detection or cure is the hold of language
on the mind. Thought, after all, is very much if not completely de-
pendent on words.
The relevancies of words consciousness can be sketched more spe-
cifically in various directions, for instance regarding the skills of prac-
tices, including advocacy, but also interviewing, counseling, drafting,
interpreting, analyzing, and so on. Our present brief, however, is
merely for creative freedom. Those who have influence with law,
whether practitioner or academic, should be free and independent
spirits, available as agents and champions for all manner of persons
and causes. A trip through the mirror practically guarantees some
measure of a new consciousness 2 which goes beyond words, when the
restraints of words are loosened.
Jurisprudential analysts can most afford a social conscience. Still
most of them have done little more than look at reflections in the
mirror rather than through it. Their preference too is advocacy,
verbalizing to move the audience, rationalizing that "legal semantics"
is of minimal importance. We go beyond semantics through that
mirror, where talking of talking enriches talking and makes for other
interesting insights as well, when words become visible, as part of
the action, not just words.
Those who direct the play of music control its sounds. Why
should the leaders, or the first fiddlers either, risk seeming discord,
subversive influence? The lag in education and in theoretical analy-
sis may be instinct-measured. For that matter, the route to words
consciousness often arouses apprehension even in those whose urge
is toward intellectual and psychological freedom. Man's view of his
world and himself is carried and reenforced in what he says and
thinks. The almost universal longing for security together with the
2 Cf. C REICH, THE GREENNG OF AMERICA (1971), discussing a "new con-
sciousness" coming out of what is now generally referred to as the "counter-culture."
Culturally, words-consciousness is on the upswing, although Reich makes no mention
of it. He adheres to traditional rhetorical ploys as is still most common but regret-
table.
1972]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 374
widespread drive for power and influence make familiar constraints
comfortable. The fledgeling most often prefers to hear not so much
what but as he has been prepared to hear, in the ways, the forms and
structure he has absorbed.
The mirror is double strengthed and protected, especially as it
reflects law from law talk. The forms and styles of law talk and
legal theory, "traditional" and "accepted" ways of talking and think-
ing, are the very traps in front. They make it most difficult even to
say what words consciousness is, because one has to go through the
mirror to see.
So the powers have decreed, the powers that be, the power of lan-
guage we inherit, the styles that co-opt. Having walked in the jun-
gle, attempted therapy in the classroom, this yet quasi-minion of
those powers is convinced that Carroll and Alice were right all along.
No usual way will do it. A way and comparatively quick to words
consciousness is through heuristic play. See it not as cynicism at all
but one kind of realistic idealism. Play and fantasy are ways of get-
ting in touch with the invisible and the unknown.
Background in Theory
Fundamentals of communication theory are incorporated in the
following exploration, as are teaching experiment and study of law
student intolerance to ambiguity3 The current counter-culture dra-
matizes the camouflage of surface forms and styles by "ripping off."
Scholarly exploration does it less dramatically: In communication
theory are the likes of Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, McLuhan, Whorf,
Korzybski, and studies in the theory of rhetoric. Anthropology and
contemporary depth psychology have contributed much to communi-
cation theory, especially to the mirror-solvent skills of participant-
observation central to words consciousness.
Legal theory has contributed too. The legal realists demonstrated
one sort of words consciousness, but stopped short, fragmented by a
different war. H. L. A. Hart explored there too but with an approach
directed by concern for the power of law(s) rather than of words.
Neither approach actually promotes words consciousness as a human-
izing influence.
Our approach goes beyond "semantics" or "linguistic analysis"
as those approaches presently sit in the popular domain. Even they,
perhaps any approach in the printed medium, cannot be appreciated
3 Studies referred to were supported partially by grants from the Educational Test-
ing Service, The National Foundation for the Humanities, and the University of Florida.
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for their potential when seen talked on paper because there they are
trapped in flatness, in the very beguilements they seek to escape.
Words cannot be fully appreciated through their marks on paper, but
only where they live, in the living and breathing, visible, fully feel-
able acts of communication. There is where the real play can be
seen, where the levels of their involvement can be viewed. It is in
this same interplay that law lives.
We now know that all communication is a multi-media experi-
ence, including analysis and interpretation, even of written words in
private, when vivified against the experience of live communication,
say in the actual dynamics of thinking which puts words on or takes
them off paper. The only lasting proof is in individual discovery.4
Serious-minded scholars may reject an invitation to play in the
"real" world, perhaps reenforcing a myth: Semantics is just playing
with words, as is linguistic analysis, or merely pedantic or quibbling.
Only a germ of truth there. The play does not start in semantics or
linguistic analysis but in the material analyzed. It is counter-play,
but in the open. Manipulators rely on insensitivity to their play.
Whether a particular piece of legalism be manipulative or self-de-
ceptive, if it works, it reflects someone's inhibition against the free
play of words potential in the creative use of language. Concep-
tualism is legalism writ large, reflecting a similar sort of inhibition
often based on someone's confusion or misconception as to which
"rules" of word use are or ought to be operant. Both forms of
ruleism involve suppression of role differentiation. The antidote is
play and/or counter-play.
Down to basics: A word-form, its particular letter or sound com-
bination, is a counter, to be moved about in various plays in accord-
ance with but not controlled by surface rules. So it is with an even
less visible surface form, that of whole assertions. We look at the
best example, the declarative sentence, the master form for law talk.
Style of assertion lets the forms do their work, in the rhetoric of
assurance.
5
A games model has heuristic function, freeing from surface en-
4 Sensitivity training in communication is yet novel in legal education. It requires a
balance of disciplined attention to the forms and media of oral and written communi-
cation with unstructured "play" to facilitate the "discovery" of their interplay in more
usual communication situations.
5 These premises as well as the entire "counter-analysis" that follows is an extrapola-
tion in synthesis of a number of explorations in communication. See, e.g., A. KORZy"-
SKI, ScInNc AND SANITY (4th ed. 1958); M. MCLUHAN, UNDMSTANDING MEDIA:
THE EXTENSION OF MAN (1964); L WITrOENSTEN, PmLOSOPmCAL INSLnGA-
iIONS (1953).
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trapments, revealing the multiple levels of communication, even in
the uni-dimensional written forms of lawyers and legal theorists.6
To play requires consideration of "rules," even those which are not
articulated. It requires role identification for the various players.
The significance of any word or assertion in actual communication
situations is dependent upon the roles of the participants. Role analy-
sis is underplayed in both legal education and legal theory, in favor
of muddlement if not confusion. The proof is simple when one
considers, for instance, that law(s) is supposed to be the same for all.
Yet those who analyze it assume by choice unique relationships to
law(s). Legal theorists and lawyers too are free and could be freer
yet to play many "real life" roles not generally available to the aver-
age citizen.
Counter-Analysis
Word forms and declarative assertions have many communica-
tive functions, among others, to transmit information concerning
facts and law. However, these forms, the rhetoric of informing,
if you will, are actually used in many other ways as well. There
follows a counter-analysis, somewhat in the approach of semantics
and linguistic analysis, designed to throw light on the uses of declar-
ative assertions, the word-form "is," and word forms generally.
As a side-product, the dependence of law talk (a kind of analysis)
on everyday language forms is illustrated.7
Suppose an ordinance, "All vehicles are prohibited from munici-
pal parks... ," and providing penalties for violations. We are stroll-
ing through a park and come to two men arguing loudly, a police-
man and a man apparently in his early twenties. We inquire what
is happening. The policeman makes the following statements (de-
clarative analysis).
"This is John Smith. That is his bicycle. A bicycle is a vehicle.
It is a fact that Smith brought the vehicle into the park and rode it.
The law is clear that vehicles are not to be ridden in the park. Smith
is a law breaker and must be punished."
Depending who John really is, this might become a cause c~lbre,
o See especially L. W=GrGENsTBiN, supra note 5, for his provocative theory of lan-
guage games presented in the style of a socratic monologue.
The expression "counter-analysis" is used deliberately in response to those who
would reject "semantics," "conceptual analysis:' and "communications analysis" gen-
erally as merely analysis. No matter how complete or purely descriptive an assertion,
it is analytic in the sense that it is some sort of verbal slicing and slanting with respect
to the non-verbal matters it "represents."
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but much more controversial situations are and ought to be imagined.
For this reason, some liberties are taken with the way a policeman
would talk, to project the example into situations which are more
volatile.
(1) This is John Smith: Naming, identifying, saying little more
about the person than calling him A. "Is" attaches the name.
(2) That is his bicycle: By itself seems only identification again,
but also serves to classify into a familiar, seemingly unnoteworthy
category. Taken with later statements, the classifying function of
"is" take on a logical significance, a rhetoric of reason. "Is" is persua-
sive!
(3) A bicycle is a vehicle: Continuing the logic of classification,
but also moving out of relating what is observable to what is not
there. Comes dose to being purely verbal, relating words to words,
rather than things to words. Sounds like an equation, or as if syn-
onyms involved; i.e., bicyde--vehide; as if refutation not possible,
as with 2+3=5. Actually, the "rules" of word usage do not require
but merely permit the move from one level of categorization to an-
other. Finally, if we look at the total set of assertions, we see a
typical example of the way everyday "facts" become law facts. Com-
pare: "I am free to treat the bicycle as a vehicle and hereby do so."
(4) It is a fact that Smith brought the vehicle into the park and
rode it: In a live situation, given the status and roles of the parties,
the forms are not apparent, giving special status to the words that
ensue. Compare: "It is my belief... ," or "my fantasy .... ." Espe-
dally significant is the evaluation of the object as a vehicle, named as
a fact, perhaps more obvious than usual here because of the progres-
sion in the set of assertions and the accompanying counter-analysis.
This evaluation is an analysis, both in the world of facts and the
world of law, given the context of the other statements. They can-
not be ignored in a valid counter-analysis, in seeing what is being
done with words. Finally see that the form of information-giving
may make it seem as if the only test of legitimacy of the assertions
is akin to fact verification, i.e., visual observation and common ex-
perience.
(5) The law is dear that vehicles are not to be ridden in the
park: The logic of classifying continues into the evaluation. We
are purely at the verbal level now. "Is" now comes the closest yet
to equivalency significance, camouflaging an interpretation. What is
presented as an almost self-evident piece of information seems
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further, via "the law," to refer to the whole machinery, some finished
product, rather than the raw material of an uninterpreted ordinance.
(6) Smith is a law breaker and must be punished: A conceptual-
istic use of "is," a rolling of its various functions into one. The
logic-rhetoric hides the evaluations and the socio-legal discretions
that are common in interpretation and implementation of all law(s).
Laws do not operate automatically in the real world. Of course
authority and apparent knowledge-ability play their parts. If some-
one else had uttered the hypothetical assertions to the policeman,
rather than in the way it actually occurred, then his options were
several, even if "the law is clear."8
Name Game
One of the earliest word games is the name game: This is a cup.
That is a marble. Here is a cookie. Names serve many functions in
various other games where the rule is that you cannot change the
name. Later there comes another level of complexity. A marble
may fit into the mouth, but it does not belong to the food family.
Thus the naming game serves the purpose of indicating what games
can be played with the things that are named. (Compare: This is
a battery.)
He who provides names controls the games that can be played!
Fact Game
A variation on the name game and much more a word game than
is generally appreciated. Name words are learned when one is play-
ing games with things or people. They can be moved about in the
fact game when one wants to play the game of talking about games
that have been previously played, or to talk about things, people, and
situations that are not at hand. Consequently, there is no way to
play except with words. A minimum of equipment is needed. One
is permitted free play in imagination to act almost as if the named
things were right there.
Later on disputes arise, especially on how to name things that are
not there or maybe not anywhere. He who would control must have
some sort of dominant power or influence. Sometimes it is enough to
have skill with the fact game itself. High honors go to him who
8 This simplified counter-analysis is but a primitive model applicable to any prof-
fered piece of legal analysis, wherever. One of the controversial areas of application
concerns "civil disobedience," but any traditional legal analysis is revealed as potentially
controversial.
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plays other games while seeming to play only the fact game. The
most skillful later on become reporters, lawyers, or sociologists. Ex-
perts in jurisprudence tend to skip over the fact game in favor of
the information game.
Feelings-Emotions Game
Early play is non-verbal, in the primitive forms of crying, smil-
ing, giggling, and that sort of thing. Then one learns to put names'
to this or that pain, emotion, or feeling.
While "bodily language" is in many ways superior in certain
situations, it is not allowed in most. The rules can be most perplex-
ing for the novice because he has also learned how to achieve cer-
tain gains by working for sympathy or appreciation through a free
play of emotion, to get others to feel for him or with him or to
share his emotions and feelings.
Somehow he learns to put his feelings into words that hide them,
a considerable achievement not accessible to all. A laggard will not
do well in law school and certainly cannot cut much of a mark as a
legal theorist. Special training in rhetorical skills helps. The surest
technique is for the player to pretend that everyone feels just as he
does and then to move quickly and quietly into the fact or informa-
tion game.
Semantics Game
This sort of play is still disquieting and best rebuffed as subver-
sive. It is particularly troublesome to those who have mastered all
variations of the name and fact games. The victory cry is, "I know
what you're doing!" The palm may go to the player who proves it is
the other who is playing games with words.
There are many examples of games within games, but this is one
of the few where a player tries to make it explicit. It is still not
"in" to do that. A variation on the semantics game is to say simply,
"that's just rhetoric." This should be called as a foul because really
that is just another way of saying "You're playing games."
Another more disarming variation is as follows: Player A names
and/or facts. B plays semantics by saying "loaded words," or
"You're giving me feeling instead of facts," or in sophisticated cir-
cles, "That's a value judgment." The reply, most popular in the
counter-culture, is "Of course," implying, "No other way, man."
Such candor will probably not spread or be long-lived. The old-
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fashioned liberal has a ploy of his own. As an A he simply ex-
presses disdain of the semantics game as being archaic, like diagram-
ming sentences.
The semantics game is generally limited to informal conversation
situations, hardly ever being seen in scholarly writings, nor in lawyer
analysis or legal theory commentary. The skillful semantics player
is pretty well confined to play behind closed doors, making his re-
joinders by the rules of the more traditional game, say by arguing
about facts, following the general rule that the real rules are to re-
main covert.
Information Game
This may be the most important intermediate game, stemming
from the basic name and fact plays. Of course the sharpest plays
are made by professionals, especially those skilled in the even more
complicated law-information game.
Any fact-appearing sort of information can be used in a great
variety of other games. To illustrate, suppose a Father and young
Son who has just now walked through an open door: "The door is
open." Son, being a mere mortal, is doubtless in some way aware
the door must be open. Father's obvious word game is actually an-
cillary to another communication game, and no particular subtlety
is involved wherever it is used as a move. Those games analysts
known as students of rhetoric discovered this sort of move at least
as long ago as Aristotle. They maintain that most verbal communi-
cation is designed to move the person(s) addressed. It is worked
most successfully when the moving force is not apparent, for instance
in traditional forms of law talk and legal theory.
As we have noted, semantics and rhetoric9 counter-plays are most
often used to make explicit subsurface games. We are engaged in
related counter-analysis. Naturally counter-play is not always rhe-
torically appropriate, although the counter-play may itself move
beneath the surface. Thus suppose that Wife says to Husband,
"Did you see that Maria just got married ?" Yes he did, and he knows
she knows that he knows, realizing instantly he is being twitted or
worse. "Yes, of course. Why do you ask ?" he replies in the inno-
cent-question counter-play. "Oh, just thought you'd be interested,"
should end the match in the more restrained family.
9 There is a sense in which all verbal analysis is a study in rhetoric, as this essay at-
tempts to suggest. See generally L. CROCKER, READINGS IN RHETORIC (1965); and on
specific relevance for legal theory, J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONING
325-27 (1964).
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Yet the counter-player has gained secondary information, a little
noted advantage of the subsurface semantics game, incidentally.
One may give away his position by the use of loaded words, all the
better because the counter-player appears oblivious. We must re-
member that not everyone plays these games well. Those who en-
roll for the advanced course will discuss how any piece of informa-
tion is a give-away. The proof is easy. Every move in an informa-
tion game, including law variations, is a move in a word game as
well as some other. There is rarely any way of avoiding the taking
of a position of some sort if one is going to make this sort of move.
Detection is difficult against the skillful law-information player be-
cause he will stress that he is only saying "what the law is," or that
he does not "make the rules."
Definition Game'10
This is dearly a verbal game at the intermediate level, indispen-
sable to mastery of the more advanced game of law talk. Counter-
play brings the definitions into the open. This skill is basic to all
forms of counter-play. The novice must be warned against moving
too fast or too often because he may lose his bearings, getting dizzy
when he stops, as he must, with a sickening feeling that everybody
really is only playing games after all. There is a limit even to words
consciousness. One must be able at least to turn it down even if
he cannot shut it off, else it will obstruct more important moves.
The success of the definition player is largely dependent on the
counter-player's being stuck back at the novice level of "meanings"
and dictionaries. The player who refers to the meanings of his own
words is engaged in explicit definition. This is fun when one then
goes on to use the defined words in some other way. The more usual
approach is somewhat sneaky too because the less skillful opponent
assumes that the key terms are being used "in the ordinary way,"
and that by and large words -have set meanings.
The most delightful examples of definition play can be found in
legal theory. For many years the most popular variant was "What
is law?" Each player would say what it was, more or less subtly
actually defining "law" while appearing only to be giving self-evi-
dent information. His goal was to try to set the rules for all manner
of other games, not only in legal theory but law talk as well, even
for those out of the profession, the amateurs.
10 So-called persuasive and other definitions are discussed in Probert, Law and Per-
suasion: The Language Behavior of Lawyers, 108 U. PA. L REV. 35 (1959). The author
now prefers to speak of rhetorical definitions.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes provided an apt and provocative exam-
ple some years ago, claiming that law was a prediction of judicial
behavior: Any time a person said what the law was, whether gen-
erally as in legal theory, or specifically as in law talk, Holmes would
have it he was really predicting what a court would do.1 Holmes
was legislating. Thus, if you said you had a legal right of some sort,
he had already ruled that you were saying a court would protect you
in your claim. Explaining Holmes' move takes us afield, but it was
one of the most successful in the history of legal theory. Its greatest
significance was for counter-play. Even so, skillful law-talkers con-
tinue to play the law-talk definition game under the cover of sup-
posed purely legal terms, the very technique Holmes was most con-
cerned to prevent.
Still, one interesting consequence of Holmes' and other moves is
that the "What is law?" question is now considered camp at best.
Once again, the best technique known to legal theorists, including
sociologists who pretend not to be legal theorists, is simply to bull
one's way ahead by just using "law." This way the reader is not
put on notice so that the writer's definition may well slip by un-
noticed. A familiar example with many variations comes in response
to innocent inquiry as to how one should behave: "It's against the
law." This response may not seem to involve definition at all, but
remember the player is depending upon the other player to fill in
whatever definition will make the assertion most acceptable. Most
law talk and a preponderance of legal theory is dependent upon this
technique! Since there are numerous plays available for "law," the
odds favor this approach.
Consider an everyday example of the definition game. A and B
are driving cars which collide. A says to the policeman, "He hit me."
Little boys play a similar game. In one play of "hit," each car hit
the other, but in the sense of who is to blame, it may well be that it
was B who hit A, meaning that A did not hit B. If put to admis-
sion that "in fact" A did hit B, then A may try for lesser odds to
argue that B was responsible.
All words, legal terms included, are subject to this and other
kinds of play. Take the name game as further illustration. Sup-
pose Mother sends Son to the kitchen to obtain ashtrays for the
guests. He comes back without any, whereupon Mother scolds him
for not bringing in saucers which were all over the kitchen. Natur-
11See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897). But ct. Hart,
Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L. Q. REV. 37 (1954).
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ally he misapprehends the limits of this new game later on in life,
say when he was about to snuff out a cigarette in a fine china saucer
at dinner, or worse, in a-cup. (After all, a cup is a cup.) "My dear,
here is an ashtray," soon alerts him to the way to behave. While
to the counter-player expert -vords like "ashtray" or "saucer" are not
merely moves in a verbal game, he has to be aware of the interplay
of verbal rules and social rules. In these examples, whether or not
a saucer is also an ashtray involves a position. These games are anal-
ogous to that played by Holmes in defining law as a prediction of
judicial behavior.
The basic move, remember, is that the definition player seems to
be relying on something approaching fact. Again, open counter-
play is not always advisable, counter-definition often being more
strategic. If stuck for ideas, one may play word consciousness with
the door dosed.
Law Talk' 2
All of the other games are prerequisite to this advance play, much
to the despair of sticklers and other Utopians who prefer to have
law talked to very special rules. They confuse two different kinds
of rules, doing innocently what the master player does deliberately.
He is most difficult to uncover because he looks legalistic and every-
one realizes that legalists are practically uncurable short of therapy,
a game they particularly resist.
The legalist, real or pretend, puts forth so-called legal rules as en-
tirely controlling, leaving unspoken and even undetected the rules
of words and assertions. He is backed by the similarity in appear-
ance of the fact game where there are no explicit rules to discuss.
Thus freedom, yea the requirement, to refer to legal rules (or laws)
provides further cover in law talk.
The technique is most evident where there is some sort of formal
or official set of words which dearly is a legal rule. Fairly simple
statutes or ordinances illustrate. Nonetheless, even when one "ap-
plies" such a complex set of words, he is unavoidably involved in
a word game.
1 2 This and the next section distinguish the rhetoric, for instance of advocates in
court (law talk), from the rhetoric of commentaries in legal theory. To move from
one to the other actually requires translation. For instance, the very word "law" tends
to have quite distinctive meanings in the two generalized contexts. Further, law talk,
as a communicative phenomenon, moves the observer from law on the books (what
law talk purports to describe) to law in action, in which the talker is actually usually a
participant. Cf. J. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW (1936).
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First, compare another situation having articulated rules. When
one is playing a card game, if he has mastered the explicit rules,
he need not refer to them except in a dispute. When a rule is then
invoked, the card play ceases and the word game appropriate to that
situation begins. This is a rule game, parallel to name, fact, and in-
formation games. It is a game within, ancillary to, the card game.
There are usually rules for the rule game, just as in other word
games, but they are usually not articulated, sometimes being created
on the spot.
There are similar unspoken rules for invoking or "applying" or
"interpreting" statutes and ordinances. The master player makes it
appear that the statute or ordinance is controlling even when he is
playing according to some private word-game rules. In the old days,
this sort of word game had something close to explicit "rules" which
made the players' moves virtually undetectable.
Thus, suppose the ordinance prohibiting all vehicles from public
parks. The legalist's ploy, in accordance with his explicit rules for
this sort of game, is that "the meaning of the words is clear." So, if
he decides that bicycles should be excluded, bicycles dearly are ve-
hicles, as any dictionary will show. Contemporary linguistic sophis-
tication puts this approach in doubt, but it is still good sport else-
where. The modern judicial approach is to "look for the purpose,"
either of the legislative body or of the statute or ordinance itself.
Such search promotes consideration of "appropriate" rules for the
ancillary game, but correspondingly subtle moves remain so that
one need not be discouraged from reference to his own preferred
stock.
The game is freer when the legal rules themselves are not for-
mally fixed as is the case in pure common law. One interested in
the full details of those plays need merely consult the considerable
literature constituting the counter-play of the legal realists. Remem-
ber they were playing their own games, so discount their value about
20 per cent.
While there are thus at a minimum two sets of rules in law talk
situations, the master legalist makes play more difficult by omitting
all reference to rules. He moves in the name-fact-information pat-
terns. Sizing up things, he says, "That's a battery," or "What you
have here is income rather than a gift." When pushed, he will pro-
duce the relevant legal rules, by which time the counter-player is
completely diverted from focusing on the rules of the word game
which is being played.
WORDS CONSCIOUSNESS
The super-master legalist is practically unplayable since he re-
sorts almost entirely to the fact game. Opposing players are pulled
off balance in misreading the signals to mean it is the fact game they
learned as children. While the professional legalist is good at that
game, his real advantage accrues from subtle movement back and
forth from that game into law facts, so that he rarely need do more
than wave his hand in the direction of legal rules somewhere "out
there."
Recalcitrant law students should now appreciate why it does take
three years to learn to play the complex of games which are involved
in putting together law talk (legal rules plus ancillary word rules),
law fact, and everyday fact games. It takes one year alone to learn
to roll it all up, keep a straight face, and say, "The law in this case
dearly is . . ." (law information).
Theory Games
We are about out of playing room, but the best is yet to come.
Remember, this is not super-cynicism. We are playing. Still, noth-
ing has been said in this games analysis that is not supported by cred-
ible literature from either or both legal and communication theories.
In this connection, take a bit of a further look at this whole busi-
ness of rules. It will help if you will remember that "rules"'is merely
a word form, as you see it here. In the world of live communica-
tion, it is used in a great variety of ways.
At the level of theory (i.e., in the parlance of games analysis,
when you are playing a legal theory game), it is quite legitimate to
say that what are called legal rules at the level of law talk are "not
really rules at all." From our vantage point, we can even agree
with the theorist because we appreciate his perspective (see his game
situation), and yet realize that it is quite legitimate at the level of
law talk (e.g., a lawyer in court) to say, "In this case, the rule of
law is ... (thus and so) .. ..
Play at the level of legal theory is one thing, that at the level of
law talk quite another, as we can see possibly only from our particular
here and now level of engagement. From our level we can see fur-
ther that it is not legitimate at the level of law talk even to raise the
question whether legal rules really exist. That never has been and
still is not a permissible ploy when really talking law. Actually,
there is a rule against saying that sort of thing. Realize, however,
that the law talker is free to say that the opposing player has put
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forth some particular assertion which is not really a rule (maybe a
mere principle) or not the correct rule.
The legal theorist who says there are no legal rules, or hardly
any, is playing a different game from the law talker in court or the
one in the construction project, one actually permitted in the total
playability of the word-form "rule." We have already seen justi-
fication for this sort of theoretical (theory level game) assertion.
By one definition, a rule is the ultimate binding assertion. But if no
so-called legal rule is applicable without other, albeit comparatively
invisible rules, the rules for playing with the words in the rule (re-
member bicycle=vehicle?), then either those word-rules are the ulti-
mate rules or at least they can prevent the so-called legal rules from
being ultimate.
Someone may say, "Well, rules do not have to be all that binding
to be legal rules." That is simply a move to legitimize the way peo-
ple talk when they talk law, but it is not needed because they are
going to continue to talk that way anyway. They are the ones who
determine the rules for talking (legal) rules. Our interest at the
moment is not to say that law talk should be outlawed, nor is it to
say that legal theory talk is phony, although both kinds of talk are
different games. Nor is it to say they are always mutually exclusive
games, except for the sort of illustration given about the existence
or non-existence of rules.
However, there is really no person who talks about law who al-
ways plays the law-talk game. After all, anyone is free to (play)
law talk in one room and then go next door and engage in (playing
at) legal theorizing. There are a few privileged souls allowed to
play both games at once, like judges writing opinions in hopefully
landmark cases, or jurisprudence teachers in torts classes. Even
lawyers are not always playing by the rules of law talk! From our
perspective, above both fields of play, we might wish we had the
power to prohibit lawyers from being bound by the rules of law
talk, at least when they are engaged in the solitaire word-games of
just thinking, analyzing, interpreting, and so on. Indeed this whole
counter-analysis is an invitation to them to come up here and play
our games with the thought they could go back and play their games
even better and maybe introduce some exciting new games when
they get back home.
Consider just one of many moves open to a law-talk oriented in-
dividual. It stems from the works of Hans Kelsen, a noted legal
WORDS CONSCIOUSNESS
theorist. He worked out what he called the "pure theory of law."' 3
In his model of law, it is made up not of rules but of norms. From
our vantage point we should applaud this move when we see the
sort of counter-play it is.
It is a refinement of an older counter-play that would say that
every assertion of law "is really an ought." Were this rule of games-
manship adopted, the entire preceding analysis would be obsolete.
How so? Simply because our stress has been on the declarative is
assertion which grounds the information and definition games
which are vital to law talk and legal theory alike. Just stop to think
how the power of the law talker is sapped if he has to say, not, the
law is clear in this case that the rule is thus and so, but "The legal
ought is... ," or better if he were reduced to saying, "The legal ought
ought to be viewed as .... " Legalism would be slowed down at
least.
But there is more to Kelsen's move than that. It goes to the mat-
ter of role-differentiation. Most legal theorists fail to take account
of socio-legal roles, although slowly the significance of this aspect
of analysis is making its way. The chief problem is that the legal
theorist tends to write as if he were writing for all possible readers
and it becomes most difficult to say, "Well, law is this way for this
group of readers, that way for another, and yet this for a third, and
so on." The advantage of a games analysis is that it leaves the mat-
ter open enough so that this or that reader can work it out for him-
self as he wishes. But Kelsen's move allows that too. The reason
why it has not been appreciated more than it has in this country is
because we are hung up on the conceptualism of LAW, both in law
talk and legal theory.
Consider the practising lawyer, just for instance. Alright, so he
plays law talk most of the time in court and other occasions. In
those situations he must talk rules, whatever he may privately think.
But when he is in the role of analyst, prior to any commitment as ad-
vocate, he quite definitely would be better off not to think rules but
norms. This is just one example but important of a way to avoid
entrapment in someone else's word-games. How he talks to clients
varies with the needs of each client. Lawyers simply cannot afford
13 See H. KsHEN, GENERAL THEORY O1 LAW AND STATE (1945). Cf. Cohen,
Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950); Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); McDougal,
Law as a Process of Decision, A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 AM. J. JUR.
(previously, NATURAL LF.) 53 (1956); Northrop, Law, Language, and Morals, 71
YALE L.J. 1017 (1962).
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to think law talk. Remember that law talk does not require any
mention of rules at all. Its basic play is with the declarative asser-
tion and some unqualified form of the "be" verb.
Anyone who has followed this analysis to this point might raise
a point in protest, that law and order, or whatever, is impossible
without a concept of law that stresses rules and the associated de-
clarative assertions. Equivocation is not a way to persuade citizens
to comply. Agreed, but we have not been involved in the analysis
that determines when we ought to restrict ourselves to the rules of
law talk games! This is plainly and simply an insider's analysis.
Language is the major instrument of social control. This analy-
sis is but a first step toward the proof. Somehow or other one has to
step outside of the powerful hold of language forms in order to see
its grasp, later on to feel its pull when inside again. This pull works
even with the comparatively non-inflammatory examples chosen for
the analysis. It is even stronger when the heat increases, although
the pull is not the same in all directions. It is when the heat is high-
est that words consciousness is most needed but naturally when it is
least tolerated.
One final query for the philosophically inclined. On which side
of the mirror is reality?
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